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Abstract
Lawyers and policymakers in Canada frequently discuss the need for reforms to increase access to civil justice,
but concrete efforts to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of our justice system are few and far
between. Unfortunately, even when reforms are implemented, measures are rarely put in place to assess
whether the reforms were effective. Ontario’s Civil Justice Reform Project inspired a package of amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure in 2010 but, aside from anecdotal reports, little is known about whether they
achieved their desired effects. This paper presents an empirical analysis of all reported summary judgment
decisions in Ontario between 2004 and 2015, in order to explore whether amendments to the summary
judgment rules actually improved the efficiency and affordability of the civil justice system as was intended.
By reviewing trends in the number and outcomes of summary judgment motions throughout the study
period, we can conclude that the amendments to Ontario’s summary judgment rules have made strides
towards their intended goal. Since the reforms, we observe an increase in the number of summary judgment
motions determined, an increase in the number of summary judgment motions granted, and, broadly, an
increase in the proportion of successful summary judgment motions. The data analyzed in this study suggest
that the “culture shift” promoted by the Supreme Court of Canada following the implementation of the new
rule is in fact underway.
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of successful summary judgment motions. The data analyzed in this study suggest that the 
“culture shift” promoted by the Supreme Court of Canada following the implementation of 
the new rule is in fact underway.
Au Canada, les avocats et les décideurs politiques évoquent fréquemment la nécessité 
d’adopter des réformes en vue d’accroître l’accès à la justice civile, mais rares sont 
les efforts déployés pour améliorer l’efficacité et la rentabilité du système de justice. 
Malheureusement, même lorsque de telles réformes sont mises en œuvre, leur efficacité 
fait rarement l’objet d’évaluations. Certes, le Projet de réforme du système de justice 
civile de l’Ontario a inspiré l’adoption en 2010 d’un ensemble de modifications aux Règles 
de procédure civile, mais, en dehors de quelques rapports anecdotiques, il est difficile de 
savoir si elles ont eu l’effet escompté. Le présent article présente une analyse empirique de 
toutes les décisions rendues dans le cadre de jugements sommaires en Ontario entre 2004 
et 2015, afin de déterminer si les modifications apportées aux règles régissant les jugements 
sommaires ont réellement amélioré l’efficacité et l’abordabilité du système de justice civile 
conformément à leur objectif.
À la lumière des tendances concernant le nombre et l’issue des requêtes en jugement 
sommaire au cours de la période d’étude, nous pouvons conclure que les modifications 
apportées aux règles ontariennes sur le jugement sommaire ont permis de réaliser de 
grands progrès vers l’objectif visé. En effet, depuis l’adoption des réformes, le nombre 
d’affaires tranchées par jugement sommaire a augmenté, le nombre de requêtes en jugement 
sommaire accordées a progressé et, globalement, la proportion des requêtes en jugement 
sommaire qui sont accueillies s’est accrue. Les données analysées dans la présente étude 
montrent que le « virage culturel » encouragé par la Cour suprême du Canada à la suite de 
l’adoption des nouvelles règles a bel et bien eu lieu.
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CANADIANS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED with the inefficiencies of the justice system 
for decades. In 2010, numerous amendments were made to the Ontario Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the latest significant effort to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the civil justice system. Among these amendments were changes 
to Rule 20—the rule respecting summary judgment—which were designed to 
make it easier for Ontarians to achieve a final disposition of their dispute without 
the necessity of a lengthy and expensive trial. No measure was put in place, 
however, to see whether the goals of this reform were achieved. 
This article explores the question of whether the changes to Ontario’s 
summary judgment rule in 2010 actually achieved their intended effects. To do so, 
it conducts a detailed empirical analysis of all reported summary judgment 
decisions between 2004 and 2015—the six years prior to and following the 
implementation of the new Rule 20 on January 1, 2010. By reviewing trends 
in the number of summary judgment motions determined over this period, and 
the outcomes of such motions, I seek to determine how the 2010 reforms to 
summary judgment procedure affect litigants’ and judges’ behaviour, and assess 
if any lessons learned through the latest slate of reforms can be applied to further 
improve the efficiency of civil dispute resolution moving forward.
The data collected and analyzed in this study provide quantitative support 
for the notion that the intended ‘culture shift’ is in fact underway, moving the 
emphasis in civil dispute resolution away from the conventional trial. Since 
the reforms, there has been an increase in the number of summary judgment 
motions determined, an increase in the number of summary judgment motions 
granted, and, broadly, an increase in the proportion of successful summary 
judgment motions.
Part I of this article provides the necessary background on Rule 20’s previous 
iterations and their judicial interpretation, as well as proposals for its reform, the 
specific amendments made in 2010, and courts’ interpretation of the amended 
Rule 20 following its implementation. These interpretations include two key 
appellate decisions: Combined Air Mechanical Services v Flesch, a decision of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal from December, 2011; and Hryniak v Mauldin, 
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a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in January, 2014. Part II 
reviews this study’s goals and methodology. Part III examines the results of the 
analysis of the number and outcome of summary judgment motions in Ontario 
from 2004–2015. Part V discusses conclusions drawn from the analysis, lessons 
that may be learned from the Rule 20 amendments and applied to future civil 
justice reform, and possible areas for future study to continue to assess and 
improve summary judgment procedures in Canada. 
I. BACKGROUND: RULES, REFORM PROPOSALS, 
AMENDMENTS, AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
A. RULE 20: THE HISTORY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ONTARIO
Prior to the introduction of the Rules of Civil Procedure1 in 1985, the former 
Rules of Practice and Procedure2 provided for the possibility of summary judgment 
“where the court is satisfied that the defendant has not a good defence to the 
action or has not disclosed such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle 
him to defend the action.”3 Notably, this rule only permitted plaintiffs to bring 
motions for summary judgment, and was confined to cases asserting particular 
claims, such as for a debt or liquidated demand.4 The test for granting summary 
judgment was strict; the Court of Appeal had held that this power should be 
exercised only in “a case which is so clear that there is no reason for doubt as to 
what the judgment of the Court should be if the matter proceeded to trial.”5
Litigants’ ability to obtain summary judgment was thus quite limited prior 
to 1985. The introduction of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 20, however, 
made summary judgment available to both plaintiffs and defendants, in the 
context of any action, at any time following the exchange of pleadings.6 The text 
of Rule 20 suggested that the new provision was to be interpreted more broadly; 
Rule 20.04 provided that the court shall grant summary judgment where it 
“is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence.”7 
1. RRO 1990, Reg 194 [Rules].
2. RRO 1980, Reg 540 [Rules of Practice].
3. Ibid, r 58(2).
4. John W Morden, “An Overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure of Ontario” (1984) 5:3 Adv 
Q 257 at 273; see also Rules of Practice, supra note 2, r 33 & 58.
5. Arnoldson y Serpa v Confederation Life Assn (1974), 3 OR (2d) 721 at para 6, 46 DLR (3d) 
641 (CA). See also Robert J van Kessel, Dispositions Without Trial, 2nd ed (Markham, Ont: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2007) at 156-61.
6. Rules, supra note 1, r 20.01. See also Kenneth J Kelertas, “The Evolution of Summary 
Judgment in Ontario” (1999) 21:3 Adv Q 265 at 268-69.
7. Rules, supra note 1, r 20.04. 
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Rule 20 was initially interpreted in an expansive manner. In Irving Ungerman 
Ltd v Galanis, the Court of Appeal helpfully explained the intended role of 
summary judgment as follows:
A litigant’s “day in court”, in the sense of a trial, may have traditionally been regarded 
as the essence of procedural justice and its deprivation the mark of procedural 
injustice. There can, however, be proceedings in which, because they do not involve any 
genuine issue which requires a trial, the holding of a trial is unnecessary and, accordingly, 
represents a failure of procedural justice. In such proceedings the successful party has 
been both unnecessarily delayed in the obtaining of substantive justice and been 
obliged to incur added expense. Rule 20 exists as a mechanism for avoiding these 
failures of procedural justice.8
Although early decisions seemed to suggest that motions judges had some 
leeway in evaluating the evidence put before them to determine if a genuine issue 
for trial existed on a motion for summary judgment,9 two subsequent decisions 
of the Court of Appeal reined in the standard. 
In Aguonie v Galion Solid Waste Material Inc,10 the motions judge had 
granted summary judgment to a defendant on the basis that the plaintiff filed her 
claim after the limitation period had elapsed. The Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision, finding that the motions judge had “exceeded his role.”11 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Borins held:
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court will never assess credibility, 
weigh the evidence, or find the facts. Instead, the court’s role is narrowly limited to 
assessing the threshold issue of whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts 
requiring a trial. Evaluating credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing factual 
inferences are all functions reserved for the trier of fact.12 
In Dawson v Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc,13 the Court of Appeal 
elaborated on its holding in Aguonie, stating: “it is necessary that motions 
8. Irving Ungerman Ltd v Galanis (1991), 4 OR (3d) 545, at para 20, 83 DLR (4th) 734 (CA) 
[Ungerman][emphasis added].
9. See Teresa Walsh & Lauren Posloski, “Establishing a Workable Test for Summary 
Judgment: Are We There Yet?” in Todd L Archibald & Randall Scott Echlin, eds, Annual 
Review of Civil Litigation 2013 (Toronto: Carswell Thomson Reuters, 2013) 422 at 426, 
citing Vaughan v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1986), 56 OR (2d) 242, 10 CPR (3d) 492 
(HCJ). See also, supra note 6, which explains the evolution of the “no genuine issue for trial” 
standard in detail, and from which I have drawn for this summary”.
10. (1998), 38 OR (3d) 161 (CA), 77 ACWS (3d) 520, rev’g (1997) 33 OR (3d) 615 (Gen 
Div) [Aguonie].
11. Ibid at 168 & 169.
12. Ibid at 173 [emphasis added].
13. (1998), 164 DLR (4th) 257, 111 OAC 201 [Dawson].
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judges not lose sight of their narrow role, not assume the role of a trial judge, 
and, before granting summary judgment, be satisfied that it is clear that a trial 
is unnecessary.”14
Courts were particularly concerned about a motions judge’s limits in assessing 
credibility. In Masciangelo v Spensieri, Justice Doherty firmly concluded that 
“[a]rguments which involve the central facts of the case and turn on judgments 
as to credibility should not be resolved on a Rule 20 motion.”15 In arriving at this 
conclusion, he observed:
Where the outcome of a law suit hinges on the assessment of credibility, a trial in 
which evidence is called and the competing stories are told and challenged before the 
trier of fact has traditionally been viewed as the ideal forum…not only because the 
trier of fact has the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, but also because 
the parties are given their day in court during which they have the opportunity to 
present their entire case, face their judge, and tell their story.16
It is particularly interesting to note Justice Doherty’s emphasis on litigants’ 
perceptions of the quality of justice they received (i.e., their ability to have their 
day in court), rather than a motions judge’s ability to assess credibility effectively 
on a written record.
B. THE OSBORNE REPORT
Although summary judgment was available to litigants following the 1985 
Rules, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “no genuine issue for trial” granted 
limited scope to motions judges. As Professor Janet Walker has explained, 
“[a]lthough this interpretation remained in place for some time, by 2006 it 
had become clear that it was not serving the civil justice system well.”17 In June 
2006, Michael Bryant, then Ontario’s Attorney General, asked Coulter Osborne, 
the former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, to lead the Civil Justice Reform 
Project (CJRP). As part of this mandate, Justice Osborne was asked to “deliver 
recommendations for action to make the civil justice system more accessible and 
affordable for Ontarians.”18 The CJRP terms of reference emphasized that Justice 
14. Ibid at para 20.
15. Ibid at 130.
16. (1990), 1 CPC (3d) 124, [1990] OJ No 1429 (HCJ) at 129-30. 
17. Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has its Day in Court” (2012) 37:2 
Queen’s LJ 697 at 702.
18. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Civil Justice Reform Project: Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations, by Coulter A Osborne, November 2007, at Appendix A (Terms of 
Reference) & B (Consultation Letter).
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Osborne’s reform proposals should “provide meaningful results in enhancing 
access to justice for Ontarians.”19 
After canvassing ideas for reform from bar associations, lawyers, judges, and 
the public,20 in November 2007 Justice Osborne submitted the CJRP’s report 
(the “Osborne Report”), which outlined numerous recommendations for civil 
justice reform, including respecting summary judgment.21 Specifically, the 
Osborne Report recommended that motions judges be expressly permitted to 
weigh evidence, draw inferences, and evaluate credibility on a summary judgment 
motion (i.e., do precisely that which the Court of Appeal had held a motions 
judge cannot do);22 that the Rules provide for a “mini-trial” where witnesses can 
testify on relevant issues in a summary fashion without having to proceed to a full 
trial;23 and that the presumption of ordering substantial indemnity costs against a 
moving party who is unsuccessful in obtaining summary judgment be eliminated 
due to concerns that it deterred parties from bringing Rule 20 motions.24 
C. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 2010
In 2008 and 2009, following further consultation with judges, lawyers, and 
the public to discuss the Osborne Report’s recommendations, Ontario enacted 
regulations to amend the Rules of Civil Procedure to effect some of the proposed 
reforms.25 In addition to the summary judgment reforms, the amendments 
narrowed the scope of discovery; required parties to agree on a written discovery 
plan prior to exchanging documents; made pre-trial conferences mandatory for 
all civil actions; increased the monetary limit for simplified procedure actions 
and for the Small Claims Court; established various requirements for expert 
witnesses; and imposed an overarching principle of proportionality.26
19. Ibid at Appendix A.
20. Ibid at 4-6.
21. Ibid at ii. The report also recommended reform to the Small Claims Court and simplified 
procedure process and jurisdiction; the discovery process; the process for proffering expert 
evidence; and pre-trial conferences.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid at 36.
24. Ibid at 36-37. Acknowledging the need to deter parties from using Rule 20 as a delay tactic, 
Justice Osborne suggested that substantial indemnity costs could be awarded by motions 
judges against parties who act in bad faith, but ought not be presumptive.
25. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “What’s New? Changes to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure” (January 2010) online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/
civil/changes_to_rules_of_civil_procedure.php>.
26. Ibid. See also O Reg 438/08; O Reg 394/09.
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Three key changes were made to Rule 20. First, the test for granting summary 
judgment was changed from “no genuine issue for trial” to “no genuine issue 
requiring a trial.”27 Second, motions judges were granted the power to weigh 
evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw reasonable inferences from evidence. 
Justice Osborne’s suggestion that a mini-trial could be directed to resolve the 
issues on summary judgment was accepted in part: pursuant to Rule 20.04(2.2), 
judges can order the presentation of oral evidence on a summary judgment 
motion to determine whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. Third, the 
amended Rules implemented Justice Osborne’s recommendation respecting costs: 
on a failed summary judgment motion, costs will presumptively be determined 
on a partial indemnity basis, although substantial indemnity costs may be 
ordered where a party acts unreasonably or in bad faith.28 The amended summary 
judgment rules took immediate effect on January 1, 2010. The new standards 
and powers applied to all summary judgment motions, regardless of whether the 
motion was filed before or after that date.29
D. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION AND USE OF AMENDED RULE 20
1. ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT: KEY DECISIONS IN 2010–2011 
Motions judges in Ontario initially developed divergent approaches in applying 
the revised test and their new powers.30 In Healey v Lakeridge Health Corp, Justice 
Perell acknowledged that the new powers granted to motions judges by Rule 
20.04(2.1) were a “statutory reversal of the case law,” and that the reframed test 
was intended to make summary judgment more readily available.31 In Lawless v 
Anderson, Justice DM Brown highlighted that the “[n]ew Rule 20” introduced 
a “radical change” by arming motions judges with greater powers to review 
27. Rules, supra note 1, r 20.04 [emphasis added]. Interestingly, Justice Osborne had specifically 
recommended that the “no genuine issue for trial” test not be amended; he was of the view 
that it was the limits on motions judges’ powers on summary judgment motions, rather than 
the test for granting such motions, that limited the effectiveness of Rule 20. See Osborne 
Report, supra note 18 at 35. The phrase “no genuine issue requiring a trial” appears to have 
derived from the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Ungerman. See text accompanying 
note 8. See also Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc v Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764, at para 30 
n 3, 108 OR (3d) 1. 
28. Rules, supra note 1, r 20.06.
29. Onex Corp v American Home Assurance (2009), 100 OR (3d) 313, 2009 CarswellOnt 9401.
30. Supra note 17 at 713. This section has also benefitted from other discussions of cases 
applying the amended Rules. See generally Carole J Brown & Steven Kennedy, “Changing 
the Rules of the Game: Rewinding the First Ten Months of the New Rules of Civil Procedure” 
(2011) 37:4 Adv Q 443. 
31. Healey v Lakeridge Health Corp, 2010 ONSC 725 at paras 20-23, 185 ACWS (3d) 325 
[Healey], aff’d 2011 ONCA 55.
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evidence, “vest[ing] in a motion judge the powers typically exercised by a trial 
judge.”32 Using those new powers, Justice Brown was able to determine an issue of 
discoverability on a summary judgment motion premised on a lapsed limitation 
period, and granted judgment in favour of the defendant.33 
Not all Superior Court judges, however, recognized the significance of the 
Rule 20 amendments. In Cuthbert v TD Canada Trust, Justice Karakatsanis 
held that despite the new rules “it is not the role of the motions judge to make 
findings of fact for the purpose of deciding the action on the basis of the evidence 
presented on a motion for summary judgment.”34 In both Cuthbert and Hino 
Motors Canada v Kell, Justice Karakatsanis held that the test for summary 
judgment “has not changed.”35
Motions judges in Ontario had not agreed on the appropriate interpretive 
approach of the new Rule 20 in the first two years following the amendments. 
A unified standard would not appear until the Court of Appeal announced its 
“fresh approach to the interpretation and application of the amended Rule 20” 
in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc v Flesch.36 
2. ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL: COMBINED AIR AND THE FULL 
APPRECIATION TEST
In Combined Air Mechanical Services v Flesch (“Combined Air”), the Ontario 
Court of Appeal observed that “it has become a matter of some controversy and 
uncertainty as to whether it is appropriate for a motion judge to use the new 
powers conferred by the amended Rule 20 to decide an action on the basis of the 
evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment.”37 To address this, the 
court convened a five-judge panel to consider appeals of five different summary 
judgment motions decided under the amended Rule 20,38 with the express 
purpose of providing some clarification and guidance for the bench and bar.39 
32. Lawless v Anderson, 2010 ONSC 2723 at para 19, 188 ACWS (3d) 1006.
33. Ibid at paras 22, 63.
34. Cuthbert v TD Canada Trust, 2010 ONSC 830 at para 11, 185 ACWS (3d) 768 [Cuthbert].
35. Hino Motors Canada v Kell, 2010 ONSC 1329 at para 7, 185 ACWS (3d) 1100 [Hino 
Motors]; Cuthbert, supra note 34 at para 11, citing Ungerman, supra note 8.
36. 2011 ONCA 764 at para 35, 108 OR (3d) 1 [Combined Air].
37. Combined Air, supra note 36 at para 5.
38. Appeals from Combined Air v Flesch, 2010 ONSC 1729, 187 ACWS (3d) 100, Belobaba 
J; Bruno Appliance v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2010 ONSC 5490, 229 ACWS (3d) 
932, Grace J (addressing two parties’ separate motions); 394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc 
v Misek, 2010 ONSC 600, 194 ACWS (3d) 1313, Perell J; Parker v Casalese, 2010 ONSC 
5636, 194 ACWS (3d) 95 (Div Ct) Kruzick, Swinton, and Harvison Young JJ.
39. Combined Air, supra note 36 at para 6.
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1284
In unanimous reasons “by the Court,” the Court of Appeal held that the 
amended Rule 20 permits a motions judge to grant summary judgment to 
dispose of an action “where he or she is satisfied that by exercising the powers that 
are now available on a motion for summary judgment, there is no factual or legal 
issue raised by the parties that requires a trial for its fair and just resolution.”40 
The court accepted that the new rule made clear that the restrictions formerly 
imposed on motions judges (as articulated by the Court of Appeal in Aguonie 
and Dawson) were no longer applicable, and that the amendments were “meant 
to introduce significant changes in the manner in which summary judgment 
motions are to be decided.”41 
Discussing the new wording of the test (from “no genuine issue for trial” 
to “no genuine issue requiring a trial”), the court held:
This change in language is more than mere semantics. The prior wording served 
mainly to winnow out plainly unmeritorious litigation. The amended wording, 
coupled with the enhanced powers under rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2), now permit the 
motion judge to dispose of cases on the merits where the trial process is not required 
in the “interest of justice.”42
The court emphasized, however, that the new rule was intended to eliminate 
unnecessary trials—not all trials—and proceeded to discuss why a trial is necessary 
for the fair and just resolution of many cases.43 It highlighted a trial judge’s 
“privileged position,” participation in the trial dynamic, and “total familiarity 
with the evidence,”44 noting that a trial judge “sees witnesses testify, follows the 
trial narrative, asks questions when in doubt as to the substance of the evidence, 
monitors the cut and thrust of the adversaries, and hears the evidence in the words 
of the witnesses.”45 The court concluded that a trial judge’s participatory role 
“provides a greater assurance of fairness in the process for resolving a dispute.”46
The Court of Appeal held that on a motion for summary judgment, the 
motion judge must ask: “can the full appreciation of the evidence and issues 
that is required to make dispositive findings be achieved by way of summary 
judgment, or can this full appreciation only be achieved by way of a trial?”47 
40. Ibid at para 37.
41. Ibid at para 36.
42. Ibid at para 44.
43. Ibid at para 38.
44. Ibid at para 46, citing RD Gibbens, “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact” (1992) 13:4 
Adv Q 445 at 446.
45. Ibid at para 47.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid at para 50.
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Before using the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw 
inferences, the court held, a motions judge must apply the “full appreciation test” 
and be satisfied that the interests of justice do not require that those powers be 
exercised only after a trial.48
The court explained that in cases that call for multiple findings of fact on 
the basis of evidence emanating from a number of witnesses and a voluminous 
record, “a summary judgment motion cannot serve as an adequate substitute 
for the trial process.”49 It emphasized that achieving familiarity with the total 
body of evidence in the motion record is not the same as “fully appreciating” the 
evidence; a motions judge must consider “whether he or she can accurately weigh 
and draw inferences from the evidence without the benefit of the trial narrative, 
without the ability to hear the witnesses speak in their own words and without 
the assistance of counsel as the judge examines the record in chambers.”50
The Court of Appeal suggested that the full appreciation test might be met “in 
document-driven cases with limited testimonial evidence,” “in cases with limited 
contentious factual issues,” and “in cases where the record can be supplemented 
to the requisite degree at the motion judge’s direction by hearing oral evidence 
on discrete issues.”51 The court listed various “hallmarks” of the types of actions 
that are inappropriate for summary judgment and require a trial, including where 
there is a voluminous motion record, evidence is required from many witnesses, 
different theories of liability are advanced against different defendants, numerous 
findings of fact are required, credibility determinations lie at the heart of the 
dispute, or there is conflicting evidence on key issues from major witnesses.52
Although the Court of Appeal had created a unified standard to be applied 
across Ontario on motions for summary judgment, the court’s reasons emphasized 
the advantages of resolving disputes at trial, and sought to circumscribe motions 
judges’ powers53—just as was done by the Court of Appeal in Aguonie and Dawson 
under the former Rule 20. 
48. Ibid at para 75.
49. Ibid at para 51 [emphasis added].
50. Ibid at paras 53-54.
51. Ibid at para 52.
52. Ibid at para 148.
53. See e.g. “The discretion to order oral evidence pursuant to rule 20.04(2.2) is circumscribed 
and cannot be used to convert a summary judgment motion into a trial… The discretion to 
direct the calling of oral evidence on the motion amounts to no more than another tool to 
better enable the motion judge to determine whether it is safe to proceed with a summary 
disposition rather than requiring a trial.” Ibid at para 60.
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3. SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: HRYNIAK AND THE CULTURE SHIFT
Robert Hryniak, one of the parties in Combined Air, appealed the Court of 
Appeal’s determination that the motions judge in his case had not erred in 
granting summary judgment against him. His appeal was heard by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on 23 March 2013,54 alongside a companion appeal brought by 
Bruno Appliance and Furniture (another party in the Combined Air appeals).55 
Both cases related to allegations of civil fraud against Hryniak. In an interesting 
turn of events, Justice Karakatsanis—who had issued two decisions minimizing 
the impact of the Rule 20 amendments when she sat on the Ontario Superior 
Court56—authored the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Hryniak.
The Court began its reasons by acknowledging that many Canadians simply 
cannot afford to sue when they are wronged, or defend themselves when they 
are sued, because trials have become increasingly expensive and protracted.57 
Such circumstances threaten the rule of law and hinder the development of the 
common law, and have resulted in increased recognition that a culture shift is 
required in order for Canadians to have timely and affordable access to the civil 
justice system.58 This culture shift, the Court held, requires
moving the emphasis away from the conventional trial in favour of proportional 
procedures tailored to the needs of the particular case. The balance between procedure 
and access struck by our justice system must come to reflect modern reality and 
recognize that new models of adjudication can be fair and just.59
Significantly, and in contrast to the views of the Court of Appeal as expressed 
in Combined Air, the Supreme Court held that we “must recognize that a process 
can be fair and just, without the expense and delay of a trial, and that alternative 
models of adjudication are no less legitimate than the conventional trial.”60
The Supreme Court overruled the approach provided in Combined Air, 
holding that “the Ontario Court of Appeal placed too high a premium on the 
“full appreciation” of evidence that can be gained at a conventional trial, given 
that such a trial is not a realistic alternative for most litigants.”61 The Court held 
that while the goal remains to maintain “a fair and just process,” such a process is 
54. Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, 1 SCR 87 [Hryniak]. 
55. Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc v Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8, 1 SCR 126 [Bruno].
56. See Cuthbert, supra note 34; Hino Motors, supra note 35. See the text 
accompanying notes 34 & 35.
57. Hryniak, supra note 54 at para 1.
58. Ibid at para 2.
59. Ibid [emphasis added].
60. Ibid at para 27.
61. Ibid at para 4.
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illusory unless it is also accessible, timely, and affordable—and the cost and delay 
of the traditional trial process effectively denies many ordinary Canadians the 
opportunity to adjudicate their disputes. As such, “the best forum for resolving a 
dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure.”62
Reviewing the 2010 amendments, the Supreme Court held that the new 
Rule 20 “demonstrates that a trial is not the default procedure.”63 The Court 
reversed the onus that the Court of Appeal held must be applied in Combined 
Air, holding that the new fact-finding powers granted to motions judges are 
presumptively available, and ought to be exercised unless the interest of justice 
requires them to be exercised only at trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
2010 amendments were “designed to transform Rule 20 from a means to weed 
out unmeritorious claims to a significant alternative model of adjudication.”64
Rather than list relevant factors and categories of cases, as the Court of 
Appeal had done, the Supreme Court preferred to articulate general principles 
for determining whether there is no genuine issue for trial, holding:
There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair 
and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will 
be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of 
fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, 
more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.65
Although still providing little by way of concrete guidance, Justice 
Karakatsanis elaborated on this general rule as follows:
When a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts 
and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally not be proportionate, 
timely or cost effective. Similarly, a process that does not give a judge confidence 
in her conclusions can never be the proportionate way to resolve a dispute. It bears 
reiterating that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as 
a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and 
apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute.66
The Court emphasized that a documentary record, particularly when 
supplemented with motions judges’ new fact-finding tools, will often be enough 
to resolve a dispute fairly and justly, calling the new powers granted by Rules 
20.04(2.1) and (2.2) “an equally valid, if less extensive, manner of fact finding.”67
62. Ibid at paras 24, 28.
63. Ibid at para 43.
64. Ibid at para 45.
65. Ibid at para 49.
66. Ibid at para 50 [emphasis added].
67. Ibid at para 57.
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With its reasons in Hryniak, the Supreme Court of Canada sought to push 
both the bar and bench away from a presumption that cases should be resolved at 
trial in favour of summary judgment and other more expeditious, cost-effective, 
and proportionate means of dispute resolution. Although the Court did not 
provide concrete guidance for determining what constitutes a fair and just result, 
its message was clear: the culture of civil litigation needed to change in order 
to promote timely and affordable access to the civil justice system. Summary 
judgment motions form an important part of this culture shift.
II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY: EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ONTARIO (2004–2015)
A. GOALS OF THE STUDY
In founding the Civil Justice Reform Project, the Ministry of the Attorney 
General recognized that Ontario needed “to make the civil justice system more 
accessible and affordable for Ontarians.”68 Justice Osborne was tasked with 
making recommendations about reforms to the Rules of Civil Procedure that 
would “provide meaningful results in enhancing access to justice for Ontarians.”69 
With respect to summary judgment motions, the Osborne Report responded to 
concerns that they were brought infrequently, and that Rule 20 was not working 
as intended.70 The 2010 amendments to the Rules (stemming from the Osborne 
Report recommendations) ostensibly sought to address these issues. 
The Supreme Court in Hryniak lamented Canadians’ inability to bring or 
respond to lawsuits due to the time and expense required by trials. Accordingly, 
it championed a “culture shift…moving emphasis away from the conventional 
trial” in favour of summary judgment, in order to allow Canadians to have timely 
and affordable access to the civil justice system.71 
This article seeks to empirically evaluate whether the 2010 amendments 
to Rule 20 and their subsequent judicial interpretations did, in fact, “provide 
meaningful results in enhancing access to justice for Ontarians”72 and “promote 
timely and affordable access to the civil justice system.”73 Accordingly, I will review 
how the number and outcomes of summary judgment motions changed before 
and after the 2010 amendments, analyzing data from 2004–2015, observing in 
68. Supra note 18 at Appendix A & B.
69. Ibid at Appendix A.
70. Ibid at 33.
71. Hryniak, supra note 54 at paras 1-2.
72. Supra note 18 at Appendix A.
73. Hryniak, supra note 54 at para 2.
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particular whether and how patterns changed following three key dates: January 
1, 2010, when amendments to Rule 20 came into effect; December 5, 2011, 
when the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in Combined Air; and 
January 23, 2014, when the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in 
Hryniak. I will assess this data with a view to answering the following questions: 
(1) Did the number of summary judgment motions decided in Ontario increase? 
(2) Did the number of summary judgment motions granted increase? and (3) 
Did the proportion of summary judgment motions granted increase?
By assembling and analyzing a single data set using a consistent methodology, 
I hope to meaningfully examine long-term trends as to how Rule 20 has been 
interpreted and applied, and to observe how litigants’ and judges’ behaviour has 
been affected by the amendments to Rule 20 and its subsequent interpretation 
by appellate courts. Ultimately, this article seeks to answer the question: Did 
summary judgment reform achieve its desired effects?
B. METHODOLOGY
1. SOURCE OF DATA (JUDGMENTS)
I sought to review all reported74 decisions rendered on motions for summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure from 2004 
to 2015 (the six years prior to and six years following the relevant amendments). 
I collected, as primary data, all Ontario cases decided between 1 January 2004 
to 31 December 2015 containing the search terms “summary judgment,” 
or “summary judgement” and “motion.” I downloaded all 6,517 cases that met 
these parameters from Quicklaw75 on 3 January 2016.
2. METHOD OF SORTING AND CODING JUDGMENTS
The search terms used to collect the summary judgment decisions (described 
above) were over inclusive; they captured numerous cases that were not summary 
judgment motions, including trial decisions, procedural motions, and costs 
motions referring to an earlier summary judgment motion; motions referring 
to the general concepts of proportionality and access to justice as articulated in 
the Osborne Report, Combined Air, and Hryniak; motions for leave to appeal 
74. “Reported” refers to decisions available through the three major Canadian publishers of court 
decisions: CanLII, Westlaw (Carswell), and Quicklaw (LexisNexis), not only cases published 
in print law reports.
75. I also reviewed CanLII and Westlaw, but used Quicklaw as my source because it gathered 
the most results from this search query. The Quicklaw search resulted in 6,517 cases after 
excluding duplicates (i.e. cases reported in multiple sources). An identical search in Westlaw 
garnered 6,322 results, and CanLII had 6,319 results.
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a summary judgment decision; and motions similar to summary judgment 
pursuant to the Construction Lien Act or proceeding under the Family Law Rules.76 
I reviewed each of the 6,517 decisions collected to identify and exclude from the 
dataset all decisions that were not decisions on motions for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 20, or appeals thereof. This left 2,960 decisions pursuant to 
Rule 20 motions for analysis. Each of the 2,960 summary judgment decisions 
were coded for the following variables:77
1. Case name 
2. Court file number or docket 
3. Citation(s) 
4. Date the summary judgment motion was heard78 
5. Date of summary judgment decision 
6. Name of judge(s) or master presiding over summary judgment motion 
7. Whether the decision-maker was a judge or a master
8. Level of court (i.e. Ontario Superior Court, Ontario Superior Court–
Commercial List Divisional Court, or Court of Appeal) 
9. Moving party79 
76. The search also captured cases decided under Rule 76.07 (summary judgment in simplified 
procedure actions), before it was revoked in March 2008. These were included in the dataset 
for the purpose of consistency, as for the majority of the study period (upon revocation of 
Rule 76.07) summary judgments under simplified procedure rules were governed by Rule 
20. It should be noted, however, that prior to March 2008, Rule 76.07(9) provided for a 
different test than Rule 20: “The presiding judge shall grant judgment on the motion unless, 
(a) he or she is unable to decide the issues in the action without cross-examination; or (b) it 
would be otherwise unjust to decide the issues on the motion.”
77. The data were first reviewed using software developed for the purpose of this research to 
gather various easily identifiable data points (i.e., those which appear in each judgment 
in the same format and location), then input this data into an Excel spreadsheet. Review 
and coding for the moving party, disposition, representation, and appeal status was done 
manually by the author.
78. Where the motion was heard over multiple dates, only the first date is identified. I made this 
update to the dataset manually on my review of each case. If the decision only identified one 
date, it was deemed to be both the date the motion was heard and the date of decision.
79. Coded as follows: (1) Plaintiff(s); (2) Defendant(s); (3) Plaintiff(s) with defendant 
cross-motion; (4) Defendant(s) with plaintiff cross-motion. Where the moving party was a 
third or fourth party, they were deemed “plaintiff” or “defendant” depending on their role in 
the claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim to which the summary judgment motion pertained. 
For instance, if a third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim 
against it, it would be deemed a defendant. However, if a third party moved for summary 
judgment on her counterclaim against the plaintiff (defendant by counterclaim), the third 
party would be deemed a plaintiff for the purpose of the summary judgment motion.
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10. Summary judgment disposition80
11. Whether the party was self-represented81
12. Appeal status82
The process of reviewing and coding the data for appeals is worth noting 
briefly, as it was necessary to ensure both that cases were not double counted, and 
that the ultimate result of a case was properly recorded. I coded all decisions of 
the Court of Appeal to indicate whether it granted, dismissed, or partially granted 
the appeal. I then located in the dataset the decision which formed the basis of the 
appeal, and coded it as to whether it was reversed, affirmed, or partially granted. 
For the purpose of counting the number of motions for summary judgment 
heard in the analysis below, only the summary judgment motions at first instance 
were included in the dataset. Appeals were excluded so that each motion was 
only counted once, when it was first heard. For the purpose of determining 
the number and proportion of summary judgment motions granted, only one 
decision reflecting the final determination of the summary judgment motion was 
included in the dataset. Dismissed appeals and reversed and partially-reversed 
motion decisions were excluded from that analysis.83
3. THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE DATASET
The process of reviewing appeal decisions revealed an important issue with the 
dataset: there were 168 appeal decisions where the underlying motion decision 
80. Coded as follows: (1) Granted; (2) Dismissed; (3) Partially granted; (4) Granted for one 
defendant, but dismissed for another; (5) Motion granted, cross-motion dismissed; (6) 
Cross-motion granted, motion dismissed; (7) Partially granted for non-moving party; (8) 
Granted for non-moving party. For further explanation on how these were determined 
see note 94 below.
81. Coded as follows: (1) losing party was self-represented; (2) winning party was 
self-represented; (3) both parties were self-represented; (4) “no one appearing” for losing 
party. I note that where a party was unrepresented but at least one other party with 
whom interests were aligned was represented by counsel, the party was not deemed to be 
self-represented. This arose on very few occasions, typically in the context of co-defendants 
with substantially overlapping interests in defending the claim.
82. Coded as follows: (1) Appeal granted; (2) Appeal dismissed; (3) Appeal partially granted; (4) 
Appealed and reversed; (5) Appealed but affirmed; (6) Appealed, partially granted; (7) Leave 
motion; (8) Appeal dismissed, but underlying decision not reported; (9) Appeal granted, but 
underlying decision not reported.
83. Any appeals which pertained to motions decided before the study period (i.e., prior to 2004) 
were also excluded from the database. 
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1292
was not reported.84 Although this issue could be addressed for the decisions in the 
database,85 it raises the question of how many decisions are not (and could not 
be) included in the database because they were never reported. I embarked on this 
project with the inaccurate assumption that Ontario’s courts were reporting all 
their summary judgment decisions to Quicklaw, Westlaw, or CanLII. Discovering 
that numerous appeals pertained to unreported summary judgment motion 
decisions proved this assumption to be incorrect. There was a total of 509 appeal 
decisions in the dataset, meaning that of all summary judgment appeals decided 
from 2004–2015, 33 per cent pertained to decisions that were not reported on 
Quicklaw, Westlaw, or CanLII. This is a rough measure, but it suggests that a 
significant proportion of motion decisions in Ontario courts go unreported.
As a result, the unfortunate reality is that the dataset used for this analysis 
does not include all summary judgment motion decisions in Ontario courts, 
as it is limited to those decisions that were reported. It is not possible to 
know what decisions are not reported.86 It is worth noting, however, that 
year-over-year analysis of the number of appeals of unreported decisions suggests 
84. Upon realizing that the lower court decision was not in the database, I confirmed that in 
each of these 168 cases, the lower court decision could not be found on any of Quicklaw, 
Westlaw, or CanLII. 
85. These decisions were coded in a manner so they could stand in for the unreported lower 
court decision: the “date heard” variable was modified to refer to the date the original motion 
was heard, as indicated in the appeal decision. The appeal decision could then be used in 
both the analysis of the number of motions heard and of the number and proportion of 
motions granted.
86. I note that prior to developing my methodology of pulling all reported decisions from 
Quicklaw, I first spoke with two representatives from the office of Management Information 
at the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) about the possibility of obtaining 
summary judgment data directly from the Ontario Superior Court. Unfortunately this was 
not possible. Court administration is arranged at the regional level in eight judicial regions 
in Ontario, and until recently court files were paper-based and physically located in each 
region’s court office. From my discussions with the MAG representatives, I understand that 
it was not until 2009 that a unified electronic filing database was rolled out across all eight 
judicial regions. See interview with Jim Andersen & Balwant Neote, January 11, 2016. 
Between 2009 and 2014, there were further efforts to update and consolidate Ontario courts’ 
case management systems into a new Court Information Management System, but this 
project was abandoned when only partially completed. See e.g. Drew Hasselbeck, “Ontario 
moves towards digital court records,” Financial Post (9 May 2012), online: <http://business.
financialpost.com/legal-post/ontario-moves-toward-digital-court-records>; Allison Jones, 
“Ontario admits it blew $4.5-million on failed court modernization project,” National Post 
(19 September 2014), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/ontario-admits-it-
blew-4-5-million-on-failed-court-modernization-project>. As a result, although some 
data could be obtained from MAG on summary judgment motions, the data would be 
incomplete (as it would not cover the time period required of this study), and it would 
not necessarily be consistent across judicial regions in Ontario. Using data obtained from 
MACKENZIE,  EFFECTING A CULTURE SHIFT 1293
that the proportion of unreported decisions remains fairly consistent across 
the study period.87
Finally, in reviewing all appeal decisions, I discovered a handful of cases 
where the underlying decision was reported, but had not been captured in my 
search terms (i.e., the terms “motion” or “summary judgment” did not appear 
in the text of the decision).88 This occurred fifteen times, which represents 2.9 
per cent of the 509 appeals. I collected, reviewed, and added each of these cases 
to the dataset. 
Although (as noted in section B(2)) the search terms used were vastly over 
inclusive, it was perhaps inevitable that a few decisions would not be captured 
because of the particularities of wording by a handful of judges in a handful of 
cases.89 These fifteen decisions may represent a sample of other Rule 20 motions 
that were not later captured (because they were not appealed), but in any case pale 
in comparison to the 168 decisions that were simply unreported. Nevertheless, 
the dataset represents rather a substantial (perhaps two-thirds) representative 
sample of all decisions pursuant to Rule 20 during the study period. 
III.  RESULTS: EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN ONTARIO (2004–2015)
A. NUMBER OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTS RENDERED
The number of motions for summary judgment rendered has in fact increased 
since the reforms came into effect on 1 January 2010. In every year since the 
reported summary judgment decisions was thus the preferred form of obtaining data that was 
consistent and as comprehensive as possible over the full study period.
87. The distribution of the number of appeals of unreported decisions year-over-year is 
substantially similar to the distribution of all appeals of summary judgment decisions by year 
during the period.
88. Collecting decisions on the basis of search terms was required because there is no 
straightforward way to otherwise gather all summary judgment motions or motions decided 
pursuant to Rule 20; neither judges nor the courts label or otherwise categorize decisions 
as such, and the databases of decisions citing certain rules in Quicklaw and Westlaw are 
unfortunately inconsistent and under-inclusive for our purposes (they tend to categorize cases 
by whether the text of the decision including the words “rule 20” or “r. 20,” which raises the 
same problem as search terms, but to a greater degree).
89. It is also worth noting that Westlaw’s KeyCite and Quicklaw’s QuickCite tools, which 
seek to identify all cases that cite a particular legislative section (including a Rule), proved 
insufficient for the task of data collection for this study. This is primarily because they rely on 
the judge using the term “Rule 20” in her reasons, as well as an editor identifying this and 
linking the term to the KeyCite or QuickCite database. My efforts to use these tools revealed 
far fewer cases than the 2,960 identified using search terms and manual review by the author.
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reforms, the number of summary judgment decisions has been greater than all 
the years prior to 2010 reviewed:
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DECIDED IN ONTARIO, 
BY YEAR DECISION WAS RENDERED (2004-2015).
Notably, following an initial high watermark in 2011, there is a clear decline 
in the number of motions heard in 2012 and 2013 (although the number of 
motions heard in these years still remained greater than the number in each of 
the years prior to the rule change). This decline is likely due to the decision in 
Combined Air in December 2011, in which the Court of Appeal emphasized the 
benefits of trial and held that summary judgment under the new rule should only 
be granted if the motion judge can gain a full appreciation of the facts without 
a trial. This suggests that litigants and lawyers making decisions about whether 
to file a summary judgment motion understood the Combined Air decision as 
reining in the expansion of the rule.
However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak on 23 January 2014 
made clear that the summary judgment procedure should be used more often, 
we observe the number of motions increasing once again. The increase in 2014 
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is small, but the increase in 2015 is dramatic. The delay before we observe the 
substantial increase in the number of summary judgment decisions rendered is 
likely due to the time it takes for motions to work their way through the court 
process—it takes several months to prepare, schedule, and eventually argue a 
motion once a litigant decides to pursue summary judgment,90 and over 90 per 
cent of summary judgment motions heard in 2014 were reserved for an average 
of seventy-five days before a decision was ultimately rendered.91 Many litigants 
who filed motions following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak in January 
2014 would thus not see a decision rendered on their motion until 2015. 
Ultimately, the number of summary judgment motions decided in Ontario 
in 2015 was a 70 per cent increase over the number decided in 2009 (the last 
year under the old Rule 20, as well as the year in the study period prior to 2010 
with the greatest number of summary judgment motions). Even before appellate 
courts were able to offer guidance, and after the Court of Appeal interpreted the 
rule in a restrictive manner in Combined Air, the number of summary judgment 
motions increased under the new rule: 2010 showed a 22 per cent increase in 
motions decided as compared to 2009, and in 2013 (the year in the study period 
under the new rule with the fewest summary judgment decisions rendered), there 
was still a 21 per cent increase from 2009. Overall, the number of summary 
judgments decided between 2010–2015 was 65 per cent higher than the number 
decided between 2004–2009.
Another way to consider patterns in the number of summary judgment 
motions is by the date the motion was heard (rather than when the decision was 
rendered). The number of motions heard increased in 2010 and 2011, before 
falling in 2012 and 2013 following Combined Air. In 2014, following Hryniak, 
the number of motions heard jumped up once again: 
90. The wait time for a summary judgment motion to be scheduled and heard varies by court 
region, and can change over time as the court develops new practice directions and processes 
to schedule motions. From personal experience practicing in Toronto in 2014 and 2015, 
it could take a couple months to prepare and exchange motion materials, at which time the 
parties would need to attend motion scheduling court to get a summary judgment date, 
which could be four to six months away. In 2015, the Toronto region instituted a new system 
called Civil Practice Court, which required parties to be ready for their motion to be heard 
within 100 days in order to get a date—in my experience, although this reduced the delay 
between scheduling the motion and having it heard, it increased the time from initiating a 
motion to having it scheduled. In either case, further delay could result in scheduling and 
conducting cross examinations on affidavits. 
91. Calculations conducted on the dataset in a worksheet on file with the author.
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FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DECIDED IN ONTARIO, 
BY YEAR MOTION WAS HEARD (2004-2015).
Although the number of motions heard appears to decrease in 2015, this can 
likely be accounted for by the fact that the dataset was limited to judgments 
rendered up to 31 December 2015. Since judgments are often reserved for a 
number of months after they are heard, it is likely that more motions were heard 
in 2015, but had not been released by the end of the study period.92 
Interestingly, statistics from the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) 
indicate that both the overall number of new civil actions initiated in Ontario 
and the number of proceedings heard (including motions) by the Superior 
92. Summary judgment motions heard from 2010–2015 were reserved for an average of 59 
days. See “Reserve time” worksheet, on file with the author. If we view the 2015 data 
as representing just 306 days of the year to account for judgments under reserve, then 
extrapolate to estimate how many motions would be heard over 365 days of 2015, we would 
see 311 decisions heard in 2015—the highest of all years in the study period. 
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Court per year decreased after 2009.93 This suggests that the increase of summary 
judgment motions after the reforms is not attributable to an increase in the 
number of motions generally, or an increase in the number of actions in the 
Ontario Superior Court.
B. NUMBER OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED
The data also demonstrate an increase in the number of summary judgment 
motions granted and partially granted each year following the implementation of 
the 2010 amendments:94
93. “New civil actions” includes all new files commenced by claim, statement of claim, notice 
of action, and third or subsequent party claim, and does not include Small Claims Court 
proceedings or family proceedings. “Proceedings heard” includes trials, pre-trials, settlement 
conferences, motions, case conferences, assessment hearings, status hearings, references 
before Masters, passing of accounts, and appeal hearings. Unfortunately, MAG data for the 
number of proceedings heard is only available by MAG fiscal year (April 1 to March 31), 
and only up to 2012-2013, so it is not possible at this time to assess the trends observed 
following Combined Air and Hryniak as against the total number of hearings. It is worth 
noting, however, that when summary judgment motions heard are analyzed by MAG fiscal 
year, there is no significant change to the patterns observed when reviewing by calendar 
year. See “Number of New Actions Received” (data table obtained on June 14, 2016 
by request to the Management Information Unit, Court Services Division, Ministry of 
the Attorney General; on file with the author); Ministry of the Attorney General Court 
Services Division, “Annual Report 2004/05” (April 2005) at B5, online: <https://web.
archive.org/web/20151204210639/http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/courts_annual_05.pdf>; Ministry of the Attorney General Court Services 
Division, “Annual Report 2008/09” (28 May 2016) at 31, online: <https://web.archive.
org/web/20150918231116/http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/
courts_annual_08/Court_Services_Annual_Report_FULL_EN.pdf>; Ministry of the 
Attorney General Court Services Division, “Annual Report 2012-2013,” online: <https://
web.archive.org/web/20151204210257/http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/courts_annual_12/Court_Services_Annual_Report_FULL_EN.pdf>.
94. The categories of “Granted,” “Dismissed,” and “Partially granted” include groups as follows: 
I deemed a motion to have been “Granted” where summary judgment was dispositive of 
the action, including where there were cross motions and one was wholly granted and the 
other dismissed. I deemed a motion to have been “Partially granted” where a motion for 
partial summary judgment was granted; where a motion for summary judgment was granted 
in part (on some issues but not all); and where summary judgment was granted for one 
party, but not other moving parties. Motions were deemed “Dismissed” when the motion 
was wholly dismissed. These dispositions represent the final disposition of the motion as at 
December 31, 2015, including any appeals whose decisions had been rendered by that date 
(i.e. if a motion was granted by the motions judge but an appeal was granted dismissing the 
motion, the motion is deemed to have been dismissed). Considering the final disposition on 
appeal, rather than a decision at first instance that was reversed or varied, is the reason for the 
small discrepancy in year-over-year totals when compared to Figure 1.
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FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS GRANTED OR PARTIALLY 
GRANTED, BY YEAR OF JUDGMENT (2004-2015).
Once again, the greatest increases can be seen in 2011 and 2015—one year 
after each of the implementation of the new Rule 20 and the Hryniak decision.95 
Moreover, the number of motions granted and partially granted drops sharply 
in 2012, following the Combined Air decision. This suggests that not only 
were litigants and lawyers’ decisions as to whether to bring a summary motion 
influenced by the changes to Rule 20 and judicial interpretation of the new rule, 
but that motions judges followed the Court of Appeal’s guidance from Combined 
Air, which held that judges must be able to obtain a full appreciation of the 
evidence in order to grant summary judgment, and reined in the use of their 
expanded powers accordingly. 
The number of summary judgment motions granted or partially granted 
remained at that decreased level (albeit still at least 21 per cent greater than 
pre-2010 levels) until 2015 saw an increase in motions before the court 
95. This is consistent with my estimate of the time required for a motion initiated after (in 
response to) a key event to be prepared, scheduled, heard, and decided. See supra note 90; 
supra note 91 and the accompanying text.
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following Hryniak. In 2015, 257 summary judgment motions were granted or 
partially granted—nearly double the number that had been granted or partially 
granted in 2009.
C. PROPORTION OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED
In addition to the number of summary judgment motions granted under the new 
Rule 20, we must also consider whether the proportion of motions granted has 
changed over the study period in light of the revised test for granting summary 
judgment, motions judges’ new powers to assess and weigh evidence, and the 
push for a “culture shift” away from viewing traditional trials as the default 
and preferred means of civil dispute resolution. In this regard, the data are a 
little less clear: 
TABLE 1: PROPORTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS GRANTED, PARTIALLY 
GRANTED, AND DISMISSED, BY YEAR OF JUDGMENT (2014-2015). 
Granted Partially granted Granted or partially granted Dismissed
2004 55% 10% 66% 34%
2005 50% 9% 59% 41%
2006 46% 8% 54% 46%
2007 45% 7% 52% 48%
2008 49% 10% 59% 41%
2009 57% 11% 68% 32%
2010 56% 7% 63% 37%
2011 60% 11% 72% 28%
2012 51% 11% 61% 39%
2013 54% 12% 66% 34%
2014 54% 13% 67% 33%
2015 64% 12% 76% 24%
2004-2009 51% 9% 60% 40%
2010-2015 57% 11% 68% 32%
 2010-2013 55% 10% 66% 34%
2014-2015 60% 13% 72% 28%
In comparing the six-year periods before and after the amendments, the 
proportion of summary judgment motions granted or partially granted has gone 
up from 60 per cent in 2004-2009 to 68 per cent in 2010-2015.
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Given that standard for summary judgment was in flux for the first few 
years following the introduction of the new Rule 20 as motions judges muddled 
through their own interpretations of the rule and followed the Court of Appeal’s 
later-overruled guidance in Combined Air, one might focus on the outcomes 
of summary judgment motions decided in 2014 and 2015 (essentially, the 
period since Hryniak) as compared to outcomes in the pre-2010 period. This 
reveals an even bigger change: the proportion of motions granted or partially 
granted increased from 60 per cent in 2004–2009 to 72 per cent in 2014–2015. 
(One notes, however, that the proportion of motions granted or partially granted 
in the 2010–2013 period of flux under the new Rule 20 remained greater than in 
the pre-2010 period, at 66 per cent versus 60 per cent.)
These findings suggest that relaxing the test for granting summary judgment, 
expanding motions judges’ powers to assess and weigh evidence, and pushing for 
a culture shift did, in fact, result in a greater proportion of summary judgment 
motions being granted. However, when breaking down the data year-by-year, 
these proportions vary significantly:
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FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS GRANTED, 
PARTIALLY GRANTED, AND DISMISSED, BY YEAR OF JUDGMENT (2004-2015).
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In particular, the year-over-year data show that in 2004 and 2009, under 
the old Rule 20, 66–68 per cent of summary judgment motions were granted 
or partially granted—a greater proportion than in 2010 and 2012, and a similar 
proportion to 2013 and 2014. Only in 2011 and 2015 were the proportions of 
motions granted and partially granted greater than they had been in every year 
studied prior to the amendments.
Notably, the proportion of summary judgment motions granted or 
partially granted in 2004 and 2009 is significantly greater than in the other 
four pre-amendment years studied. In each of the years from 2005 to 2008, the 
proportion remained below 60 per cent—lower than all years under the new Rule 
20. Considering the entire six year pre-amendment period as a whole certainly 
suggests that the new rule made a difference in terms of motions judges’ ability 
or inclination to grant summary judgment. Perhaps the outcomes in summary 
judgment motions in 2004 and 2009 were aberrations. Nevertheless, a review 
of the year-over-year data urges caution in drawing sweeping conclusions. More 
time may be required before we can firmly conclude that the new Rule 20 has 
increased a moving party’s chances of success on a summary judgment motion.
IV.  DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions emerge from the review and analysis of all reported 
summary judgment motions decided between 2004–2015.
1. NUMBER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DECIDED
The number of summary judgment motions has increased since the 2010 
reforms. In every year since the amendments, the number of decisions has 
been greater than in each of the six years prior to the amendments. Summary 
judgment motions decided in Ontario in 2015 saw a 70 per cent increase over 
the number decided in 2009, and even before appellate guidance was provided, 
the number had increased by 22 per cent in 2010 over 2009. Overall, the number 
of summary judgments decided between 2010 and 2015 was 65 per cent greater 
than the number decided between 2004–2009. 
The number of summary judgment motions has also been responsive to 
judicial direction. In 2012 and 2013 (the two years following Combined Air, 
which promoted a restrictive interpretation of Rule 20), the number of summary 
judgment motions decreased to 266 and 238, respectively, from an initial high 
watermark of 301 in 2011. Moreover, following the Supreme Court’s push for a 
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“culture shift” in Hryniak, the number of summary judgment motions increased 
to its highest level yet (334 decisions rendered in 2015). 
Overall, the number of motions for summary judgment decided in the 
six-year period following the reforms was 64 per cent greater than the number 
decided in the six years prior to the reforms.
This data suggest that litigants have, in fact, responded to the summary 
judgment reforms by seeking to resolve more of their civil disputes (or at least 
a part thereof ) by summary judgment. In short, litigants’ response appears to 
be as intended.
2. NUMBER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS GRANTED
The number of summary judgment motions granted or partially granted has 
increased since the 2010 reforms. In every year since the amendments, the 
number of motions granted or partially granted has been greater than in each 
of the six years prior to the amendments. The number of summary judgment 
motions granted or partially granted in 2015 was 92 per cent greater than the 
number granted or partially granted in 2009. 
The number of motions granted also appears to have been responsive to 
appellate guidance. The greatest increases in the number of motions granted were 
in 2011 (the year following the initial implementation of the new Rule 20) and 
2015 (the year after the Hryniak decision), and the number of motions granted 
and partially granted dropped sharply in 2012, the year following the Combined 
Air decision. Overall, the number of summary judgment motions granted or 
partially granted in the six-year period following the amendments to Rule 20 was 
87 per cent greater than the number granted or partially granted in the six years 
prior to the amendments.
3. PROPORTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS GRANTED
Overall, the proportion of summary judgment motions granted or partially 
granted in the six-year period after the reforms (2010–2015) was 68 per cent, 
an increase over the 60 per cent granted or partially granted in the six-year 
period prior to the reforms (2004–2009). The proportion of motions granted in 
2014–2015 (the post-Hryniak period) increased further to 72 per cent. This may 
be a better indicator of the success rate of summary judgments under the new 
regime, in light of the initial inconsistency in the interpretation and application 
of the new Rule 20 (without appellate guidance, and under the now-overruled 
Combined Air ‘full appreciation’ test).
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Although it appears the success rate on summary judgments has increased 
following the reforms, we should refrain from drawing any sweeping conclusions 
at this juncture. Year-over-year data on the proportion of summary judgment 
motions granted or partially granted showed significant variability in the pre-2010 
period, and two of the six pre-2010 years studied actually showed higher success 
rates than at least two individual years in the post-2010 period. Given the further 
increased proportion of successful summary judgment motions in 2014 and 
2015, we are poised to be able to draw a more meaningful conclusion in a few 
years after more time has passed since the reforms and since Hryniak. 
Taken together with the data on the number of summary judgment motions 
granted, however, these data suggest that judges have in fact largely responded 
to the reforms by granting summary judgments to resolve more civil disputes. 
In short, judges’ response also appears to be as intended.
B. THE ROLE OF APPEALS
It is worth briefly noting how the number and outcome of appeals changed over 
the study period. After all, the new Rule 20 may not be serving to expedite the 
resolution and lower the cost of civil disputes if it resulted in an increase in 
reversals of summary judgment decisions on appeal, or a significant increase in 
the proportion of summary judgment decisions that proceeded to appeal.96
An analysis of the number and outcome of summary judgment appeals does 
not significantly affect the conclusions noted above:
TABLE 2: NUMBER AND OUTCOME OF APPEALS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




















2004 151 22 15% 5 23% 3%
2005 169 31 18% 11 35% 7%
2006 137 29 21% 12 41% 9%
2007 161 31 19% 11 35% 7%
2008 176 26 15% 6 23% 3%
2009 196 31 16% 10 32% 5%
2010 239 50 21% 7 14% 3%
96. I am grateful to an anonymous peer reviewer for the Osgoode Hall Law Journal for drawing 
this issue to my attention.
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TABLE 2: NUMBER AND OUTCOME OF APPEALS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




















2011 301 60 20% 18 30% 6%
2012 266 55 21% 17 31% 6%
2013 238 57 24% 9 16% 4%
2014 245 60 24% 9 15% 4%
2015* 334 51 15% 9 18% 3%
2004-2009 
(average)
165 28.3 17% 9.2 32% 6%
2010-2014* 
(average)
257.8 56.4 22% 12 21% 5%
Note that “reversed” includes appeals that were partially granted throughout. *Although data 
from 2010-15 is used elsewhere in this study, 2015 decisions were excluded for the purpose 
of averaging appeals by the year the motion was heard, as the dataset was incomplete in this 
regard (i.e. the dataset, which was composed of judgments up to the end of 2015, did not 
include subsequent appeals of all motions that had been heard up to the end 2015).
The number of summary judgment motions appealed and the number of 
summary judgment motions reversed both increased following the 2010 rule 
changes, but this is unsurprising given the increase in summary judgment 
motions heard since 2010, with which it is consistent.
The proportion of summary judgment decisions that were reversed on appeal, 
however, decreased slightly from 6 per cent to 5 per cent, and the proportion of 
summary judgment appeals that resulted in a reversal decreased from 32 per cent 
to 21 per cent in the period following 2010. These findings belie the concern that 
despite increased use of the summary judgment process to resolve civil disputes, 
the overall litigation process is actually being slowed (and made more expensive) 
by incorrect decisions on summary judgment that must later be reversed.
It should be observed, however, that the number of summary judgment 
decisions appealed increased disproportionately since 2010. The data show 
that 22 per cent of summary judgment decisions rendered from 2010–2014 
were appealed, up from 17 per cent from 2004–2009. This may suggest that 
summary judgment motions are taking longer to reach a final resolution in 
the post-2010 period, even if the motions judges’ decisions are being upheld 
on appeal. Alternatively, it may simply be reflective of the interpretive flux that 
resulted from the initial implementation of the new Rule 20 and the shifting 
standards provided by the appellate decisions in Combined Air and Hryniak. The 
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appropriate comparator to assess whether these increased appeals are slowing 
down the civil dispute resolution process is the increase (if any) in the number 
and proportion of trial decisions appealed during the relevant period, which is 
outside the scope of this study. 
Ultimately, as discussed in Section D below, further research relating to 
the duration and cost of a matter that proceeds to trial versus the duration 
and cost of a matter resolved through summary judgment will be required to 
more conclusively determine whether the increased use of summary judgment 
procedures since 2010 is, in fact, reducing the time and cost required for civil 
dispute resolution. 
C. LESSONS FOR FUTURE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
A few lessons on effecting civil justice reform emerge from Ontario’s experience 
with amending the rules on summary judgment. First, it is encouraging to see that 
litigants responded rationally to efforts to increase the use of summary judgment 
procedure by filing more summary judgment motions. The reforms certainly 
achieved their intended effect on litigants’ motion-filing behaviour. The increase 
in summary judgment motions heard was immediate, and remained even after 
the Ontario Court of Appeal urged caution and set the high ‘full appreciation’ 
threshold for disposing of an action on summary judgment before trial. This 
suggests that litigants’ behaviour can be influenced by amendments to the Rules, 
even before appellate courts step in to provide interpretive guidance.
I also observed that judges similarly responded rationally to the reforms 
by granting more summary judgment motions. Although more data should be 
collected and analyzed to confirm trends in success rates of summary judgment 
motion in the years post-Hryniak, it appears that motions judges are making use 
of their expanded powers, and that in doing so they are increasingly able to find 
the necessary facts to resolve the dispute, as intended by the new Rule 20. Prior 
to Combined Air, motions judges’ interpretation of their authority under the new 
Rule 20 varied widely, with some seeing the amendments as a significant expansion 
of the summary judgment procedure, and others viewing the reforms as having a 
minor effect, if any.97 After four years under the new rule, the Supreme Court of 
Canada clarified in Hryniak that an expansive approach to summary judgment 
97. See e.g. Lawless v Anderson, 2010 ONSC 2723 at para 19, 188 ACWS (3d) 1006. Here DM 
Brown J stated that the new Rule 20 introduced a “radical change” and “vests in a motion 
judge the powers typically exercised by a trial judge.” Compare Cuthbert v TD Canada Trust, 
2010 ONSC 830 at para 11, 185 ACWS (3d) 768. Here Karakatsanis J held that the test 
for summary judgment “has not changed” and that “it is not the role of the motions judge 
to make findings of fact for the purpose of deciding the action on the basis of the evidence 
presented on a motion for summary judgment.”
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was required by the new Rule 20, and in the years since we have seen the most 
dramatic changes in the prevalence and success of summary judgment motions. 
This experience suggests that appellate courts’ interpretation (and the accordant 
delay) may be required before motions judges take a consistent approach in the 
application of a new rule.
There is a potential downside, however, to relying on appellate courts to 
provide an interpretive approach to meaningfully effect a civil justice initiative. 
Ontario’s experience with Combined Air, whose restrictive full appreciation test 
to granting summary judgment was overruled by Hryniak, threatened to create 
the same “interpretive erosion” Ontario experienced with the previous Rule 20 
following its introduction in 1985, when initial enthusiasm for an expanded role 
for summary judgment gave way to increasingly narrow judicial interpretations 
of the rules in question, resulting in their infrequent use.98 
Furthermore, pushing the interpretation of the new Rule 20 through two 
appellate courts resulted in a period of flux as to the standard to be applied on 
summary judgment, creating uncertainty for litigants as to whether their motion 
would, in fact, save time and expense. If MAG or the Rules Committee wish 
to ensure a civil justice reform measure achieves its intended effects prior to its 
interpretation by an appellate court, amendments to the Rules should be clear 
and explicit about judges’ powers and when they may be used, and the test to be 
applied to the rule in question.
Ultimately, however, this study suggests that to effect meaningful change the 
stakeholders in the justice system must work together. Although we observed a 
moderate increase in summary judgment motions in the first two years following 
the rule change, these gains were significantly reduced when the Ontario Court 
of Appeal issued its decision in Combined Air that reined in the use of the rule. 
The gains returned and increased further after the Supreme Court of Canada 
promoted the use of summary judgment in Hryniak. These patterns suggest that 
access to justice initiatives cannot effect meaningful change if policymakers and 
courts are working at cross-purposes. Although small gains may be achieved 
through a change in the rules or through the case law, both are required to effect 
a culture shift.
D. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Despite recent improvements in the use of summary judgment procedures, 
Ontario’s civil justice system has a long way to go in making the civil justice system 
more accessible and affordable. This study provides some insight as to how one 
98. See Peter EJ Wells, Adrienne Boudreau & Annik Forristal, “A New Departure and a Fresh 
Approach: The Ontario Court of Appeal Decision in Combined Air” (2012) 39:4 Adv Q 477.
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reform measure affected litigants’ and judges’ behaviour in filing and granting 
motions for summary judgment. There remain, however, numerous questions 
about whether and how the new summary judgment rule truly enhances access 
to justice by lowering the overall costs of an action from commencement to 
resolution, and by expediting the duration of an action from commencement 
to resolution. 
The following are a few issues that require further study, which could build 
on this research to enhance the scholarship in this area:
1. Did Hryniak have a similar effect on summary judgment motions in 
other provinces (or in the Federal Court), even if they did not amend 
the text of their summary judgment rules? 
2. What happens to cases where a summary judgment motion is dismissed 
or only partially granted? 
a. What proportion go on to trial? 
b. Are there many consent dismissals shortly after, which may indicate 
that once parties put their best foot forward on summary judgment 
they are inclined to settle out of court?
c. Are motions judges following through on the suggestion in Hryniak to 
follow through with the matter using case management procedures?
3. What does the data show in respect of the time between commencement 
of a case to its final disposition? 
a. Has the increased use of summary judgment decreased the overall 
time it takes to resolve a civil dispute? 
b. In actions where a summary judgment motion is pursued 
unsuccessfully, does the motion have the effect of increasing the 
duration (and corresponding costs) of the case?
4. How long is the delay in scheduling a summary judgment motion 
versus the delay in waiting for a trial date in various judicial regions? 
Has the increased use of summary judgment motions increased the 
delay in scheduling a summary judgment motion? Has our problem of 
waiting months for trial been replaced or supplemented with a problem 
of waiting months for a summary judgment motion date?
5. Do litigants whose actions are resolved by way of summary judgment 
feel it was an adequate substitute for a trial? Or has increased efficiency 
in access to the courts reduced litigants’ satisfaction with the quality of 
justice that results?
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V. CONCLUSION
The data analyzed in this study demonstrate that the culture shift espoused by 
the Supreme Court in Hryniak following the implementation of the new Rule 20 
has indeed begun. Ontario has a long way to go in making the civil justice system 
more accessible and affordable for Ontarians, as we have observed an increase in 
the number of summary judgment motions decided, an increase in the number 
of summary judgment motions granted, and, at a high level, an increase in the 
proportion of successful summary judgment motions since the reforms. There 
remains much work to do in improving access to civil justice in Canada, but the 
amendments to Ontario’s summary judgment rule and its subsequent judicial 
interpretation have been a step in the right direction. One hopes the lessons 
learned from Ontario’s new Rule 20 will provide guidance for other civil justice 
reform projects, so we can continue achieving meaningful results in enhancing 
access to justice for Canadians.

